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FEDERAL JURISDICTION-THE SECOND CIRCUIT'S COMPETI­
TIVE ADVOCATE STANDING THEORY: PUBLIC OR PRIVATE MODEL 
THEORY? A CALL FOR CHOICE 
INTRODUCTION 
Article III of the Constitution restricts federal court jurisdiction 
to cases and controversies. I The Supreme Court has developed doc­
trines of justiciability to help define the case and controversy limita­
tion and the scope of federal judicial power.2 Standing doctrine is one 
such doctrine of justiciability.3 
Standing is a threshold issue in federal court litigation4 in which 
the court's inquiry is primarily focused on the party before the court 
and secondarily focused on the issues to be decided. 5 To have stand­
ing, a litigant must have a "sufficient stake in an otherwise justiciable 
1. Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 750 (1984) (stating that the case or controversy 
requirement is a "fundamental limit[] on federal judicial power"). Article III provides: 
The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under 
this Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, or which 
shall be made, under their Authority;-to all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other 
public Ministers and Consuls;-to all Cases of admiralty and maritime Jurisdic­
tion;-to Controversies to which the United States shall be a Party;-to Contro­
versies between two or more States;-between a State and Citizens of another 
State;-between Citizens of different States;-between Citizens of the same State 
claiming Lands under Grants of different States, and between a State, or the Citi­
zens thereof, and foreign States, Citizens or Subjects. 
U.S. CoNST. art. III, § 2, cI. 1. 
2. LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CoNSTITUTIONAL LAW § 3-1 (2d ed. 1988); 
Susan Bandes, The Idea ofa Case, 42 STAN. L. REv. 227, 227 (1990). For a discussion of 
the justiciability doctrines of mootness, ripeness, avoidance of advisory opinions, and stand­
ing, see TRIBE, supra, §§ 3-7 to 3-14. The scope of this Note is limited to standing doc­
trine, more specifically, competitive advocate standing. 
3. See TRIBE, supra note 2, § 3-14, at 107. Professor Tribe maintains that standing is 
"[t]he doctrine most central to defining Article Ill's requirement of a 'case' or 'contro­
versy.''' Id. 
4. Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498-99 (1975) (stating that standing is a "threshold 
question in every federal case"). 
5. Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 99 (1968); TRIBE, supra note 2, § 3-14, at 107. 
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controversy to obtain judicial resolution of that controversy."6 The 
Supreme Court has interpreted standing to consist of two sets of re­
quirements: Article III requirements and prudential requirements.7 
Article III requires that a litigant suffer injury in fact, that the injury 
be traceable to the opposing party's conduct, and that the litigant's 
injury be redressable by a judicial remedy. 8 Prudential requirements 
are derived from a set of judicially self-imposed policy considerations.9 
If standing requirements are not satisfied, the federal court lacks sub­
ject matter jurisdiction over the litigation and is unable to hear the 
case. 10 
Standing requirements, while easily stated, are in fact very diffi­
cult to implementll and even harder to reconcile. 12 One method of 
conceptualizing the standing doctrine places the varying treatments of 
standing on a bipolar continuum, marked by the private rights model 
of federal court jurisdiction on one end and a public rights model of 
federal court jurisdiction on the other end. The private model realm is 
characterized by judicial reluctance to intervenel3 in disputes unless a 
6. Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 731 (1972). See also Patricia M. Wald, The 
D.C. Circuit: Here and Now, 55 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 718, 719 (1987) (Standing is "basi­
cally ... used to decide who has enough stake in the controversy at hand to be recognized 
by the court as capable of litigating the issue. "). 
7. Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 750-51 (1984). 
8. Id. 
9. Id. at 751. These policy considerations include avoiding decisions involving gen­
eralized grievances, prohibiting the litigation of others' rights, and ensuring that a litigant's 
interests are within the zone of interests protected by the statute sued under. Id. For a 
more detailed discussion of prudential considerations, see infra notes 73-77 and accompa­
nying text. 
10. Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498-99 (1975) (The standing inquiry determines a 
court's "power ... to entertain the suit."); Sierra Club, 405 U.S. at 731-32. 
11. In re United States Catholic Conference, 885 F.2d 1020, 1023 (2d Cir. 1989) 
("Standing entails a complex ... inquiry."), cen. denied sub nom. Abortion Rights Mobili­
zation, Inc. v. United States Catholic Conference, 110 S. Ct. 1946 (1990). 
12. Standing is one of the most controversial and amorphous elements of Article III 
justiciability. See. e.g., William A. Fletcher, The Structure ofStanding, 98 YALE L.J. 221, 
221-24 (1988) (arguing that because standing is in such a confused and "unhappy state of 
affairs," it should be reduced to an inquiry into whether a plaintiff can claim relevant statu­
tory or constitutional rights and sue for violations thereot); Gene R. Nichol, Jr., Injury and 
the Disintegration ofArticle 111,74 CAL. L. REV. 1915, 1915 (1986) ("[A]fter almost two 
hundred years, the judiciary has yet to outline successfully the parameters of a constitu­
tional ·case.' "); Kevin A. Coyle, Comment, Standing of Third Panies to Challenge Admin­
istrative Agency Actions, 76 CAL. L. REV. 1061, 1062 (1988) (arguing that standing is 
unclear because traditional Article III principles "have become intertwined with . . . ex­
traconstitutional doctrines"); Jordana G. Schwartz, Note, Standing to Challenge Tax-Ex­
empt Status: The Second Circuit's Competitive Political Advocate Theory, 58 FORDHAM L. 
REV. 723, 724 (1990) (noting that standing determinations are the "most difficult compo­
nent[s] of the case or controversy analysis"). 
13. See. e.g., Allen, 468 U.S. at 752 (stating that "federal courts may exercise power 
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litigant is suing upon a right specific to that litigant. 14 Thus, claims 
common to the general population are beyond the private rights realm 
and cannot be judicially redressed in a lawsuit brought by a private 
litigant. The public model realm, on the other hand, is characterized 
by a broad judicial willingness to construe and enforce the Constitu­
tion and federallaw.1s Relying upon the public model, courts can rec­
ognize broader claims so that they can rule on the merits and, if 
necessary, enforce the government's compliance with the law.16 
Though courts do not typically announce which conceptual realm 
they are grounding their standing analysis upon, commentators have 
argued that a court's choice of conceptual realm determines the out­
come of the standing decision and, ultimately, the scope of federal 
court power. 17 The courts' failure to enunciate the model of judicial 
authority upon which their standing analysis is predicated has at­
tracted criticism. 18 Commentators have argued that failure to identify 
the underlying analytical model has produced confusion, lack of gui­
dance, contradictory results, and opportunity for courts to base their 
standing analysis on the attractiveness of the underlying merits.19 
A recent Second Circuit decision, In re United States Catholic 
Conference,2o illustrates how a court's failure to articulate the analyti­
cal framework can produce the confusion and lack of guidance that 
characterizes modem standing doctrine. In Catholic Conference, the 
only 'in the last resort, and as a necessity'" (quoting Chicago & Grand Trunk Ry. Co. v. 
Wellman, 143 U.S. 339, 345 (1892))). 
14. The private rights model is predicated upon a right-duty relationship. See Cass 
R. Sunstein, Standing and the Privatization ofPublic Law, 88 CoLUM. L. REv. 1432, 1434­
35 (1988). In other words, a litigant has standing to sue only where the opposing party 
breached a duty that they owed to the litigant. See infra notes 31-34 and accompanying 
text for a discussion of the derivations of the private rights model. 
15. See TRIBE, supra note 2, § 3-2; Bandes, supra note 2, at 281 (discussing the fed­
eral courts' primary purpose as interpreting and enforcing existing law and the Constitu­
tion); Sunstein, supra note 14, at 1446-47 (making the distinction between the private 
model basis in the right-duty relationship and public model basis in ensuring the govern­
ment's fidelity to the law). 
16. See Sunstein, supra note 14, at 1446-47. 
17. See Bandes, supra note 2, at 227 (arguing that the adoption of one of the concep­
tual models is "a primary issue of constitutional interpretation" because it "delineates the 
reach of the federal judicial power"). 
18. See TRIBE, supra note 2, § 3-14, at III ("The aspect of the Court's standing 
jurisprudence most open to criticism ... [is] the Court's lack of candor in articulating and 
justifying the basic choice (between private or public law models] it has made."). 
19. See generally id.; Bandes, supra note 2, at 319 (concluding that failure to adopt a 
model "leads to incoherence and unpredictability, as well as to a lack of judicial accounta­
bility"); Sunstein, supra note 14. 
20. 885 F.2d 1020 (2d Cir. 1989), cert. denied sub nom. Abortion Rights Mobiliza­
tion, Inc. v. United States Catholic Conference, 110 S. Ct. 1946 (1990). 
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court denied the plaintiffs, political advocates, standing to sue using a 
new theory of standing, competitive advocate standing.21 The court, 
however, failed to explicitly identify the analytical framework upon 
which competitive advocate standing is based. Moreover, competitive 
advocate standing has a dual nature: as stated by the court, competi­
tive advocate standing elicits public realm traits; however, the court's 
application of the theory elicits strong private realm traits.22 Thus, 
Catholic Conference fails to provide clear guidance on how to interpret 
competitive advocate standing .. 
Another Second Circuit decision, Fulani v. League of Women 
Voters Education Fund, 23 further complicates the interpretation of 
competitive advocate theory. In League of Women Voters, a Second 
Circuit panel granted a plaintiff standing to sue using a political com­
petition theory very similar to competitive advocate standing. Here 
too, the court failed to enunciate the analytical framework upon which 
its standing analysis was predicated. Like the Catholic Conference 
analysis, the League of Women Voters analysis can be interpreted as 
adopting either private or public models of federal court jurisdiction.24 
Thus, League of Women Voters also fails to give adequate guidance to 
lower courts and litigants. 
The Second Circuit's current formulation of competitive advocate 
21. Catholic Conference, 885 F.2d at 1028-31. Competitive advocate standing theory 
recognizes a unique Article III injury in fact: the impairment of a political advocate's 
ability to compete with fellow competitor political advocates because the government has 
conferred an unfair advantage upon fellow competitor advocates by enforcing the law in a 
discriminatory manner. Id. at 1028-29. The court's acknowledgement of this injury en­
ables a claimant to comply with constitutional standing requirements provided that the 
claimant shows a causal nexus between the defendant's conduct and the claimant's injury 
in fact. To have standing, the claimant must further satisfy judicially imposed prudential 
limitations. Id. at 1029 n.2, 1031; see also Schwartz, supra note 12 (discussing the formula­
tion of competitive advocate standing and arguing that it was misapplied in Catholic Con­
ference). For a discussion of competitive advocate standing and its derivations, see infra 
notes 83-98 and accompanying text. 
The court's standing analysis also included three other standing theories: clergy 
standing, taxpayer standing, and voter standing. Catholic Conference, 885 F.2d at 1024-28. 
The court denied the plaintiffs standing to sue under these alternative standing theories as 
well. Id. For a discussion of the relationship between voter standing and competitive ad­
vocate standing, see infra notes 87-90 and accompanying text. 
22. See infra notes 157-216 and accompanying text for a discussion of competitive 
advocate standing's dual nature. 
23. 882 F.2d 621 (2d Cir. 1989). League of Women Voters was decided one month 
prior to Catholic Conference. Judge Cardamone, the one judge involved in both Catholic 
Conference and League of Women Voters, wrote the majority opinion in Catholic Confer­
ence and, while concurring with the League of Women Voters majority on the merits, 
strongly disagreed with the League of Women Voters majority's standing analysis. See in­
fra note 110. 
24. See infra notes 181-97, 209-10 and accompanying text. 
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standing may create confusion and contradictory results in future 
competitive advocate cases. A court could seize upon either interpre­
tation of competitive advocate standing, public or private, to justify 
whichever standing decision it wished to make. This current ambigu­
ity in competitive advocate standing might allow a court to render its 
standing decision based on the attractiveness of the underlying merits 
and then justify the decision by pointing to the interpretive model that 
supports the particular holding. 
This Note suggests that the Second Circuit select and then clearly 
state the analytical framework that competitive advocate standing is 
based upon in order to provide clearer guidance to lower courts and 
litigants, avoid contradictory standing outcomes, and ensure some de­
gree of accountability. Although not a panacea, the adoption of one 
model would expose the driving aspect of standing analysis, the under­
lying analytical framework, to frank and open discussion. 
Section I reviews the history and current requirements of stand­
ing doctrine. Section II reviews the requirements of competitive advo­
cate standing and discusses the facts and holdings of two Second 
Circuit standing cases, Catholic Conference and League of Women 
Voters. Section III analyzes competitive advocate standing under both 
the public and private models of judicial authority to demonstrate 
competitive advocate standing's dual nature. Section III ends by pro­
posing a more specific form of competitive advocate standing, labeled 
partisan electoral standing, that is based on the private model of judi­
cial authority. Partisan electoral standing provides a basis on which to 
reconcile the two Second Circuit decisions. This Note concludes by 
suggesting that the Second Circuit clarify its approach to competitive 
advocate standing by articulating the theory's interpretive basis. This 
Note further suggests that such a clarification may produce more con­
sistent results and reduce lower court confusion. 
I. HISTORY AND CURRENT REQUIREMENTS 

OF STANDING DOCTRINE 

Standing doctrine is based on the case or controversy limitation 
that Article III of the Constitution places upon federal courtS.2S A 
federal court may assume jurisdiction only after it has determined that 
the claimant has established a case or controversy.26 A claimant can 
meet the case or controversy requirements of Article III by showing 
25. Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 750 (1984). 
26. Id. See supra note 1, U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, d. 1 for case and controversy 
limitation. 
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that a sufficient injury in fact exists and that there is a causal nexus 
between the defendant's conduct and the claimant's injury.27 In addi­
tion to these constitutional requirements, the claimant may have to 
satisfy judicially imposed prudentiallimitations.28 
This Section will trace the evolution of standing doctrine from its 
constitutional roots through its modem treatment. It will also provide 
an historical basis for the private and public rights models of federal 
court jurisdiction. 
A. Standing History 
In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, standing doc­
trine did not exist as a distinct body oflaw. 29 A plaintiff could bring a 
suit in federal court only if his or her claim sought to enforce rights 
protected by the common law, the Constitution, or a statute. 30 
This early concept of federal court power was predicated upon 
the private rights model interpretation of Marbury v. Madison. 31 This 
interpretation viewed as the federal courts' primary purpose the decid­
ing of disputes between private parties.32 The federal courts' power to 
interpret the Constitution was incidental to this role and used only 
when necessary in resolving the private parties' dispute.33 Thus, under 
a private model analysis, standing inquiries in suits against the govern­
ment were limited to instances where the government breached a con­
stitutional, common law, or statutory duty that it owed to a litigant. 
Litigants merely asserting that the government failed to adhere to a 
statute were forced to resort to other non-judicial means to redress 
27. Allen, 468 U.S. at 751. 
28. Id.; Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of 
Church & State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 471 (1982). See infra notes 73-77 and accompanying 
text for a discussion of prudential limitations. 
29. Fletcher, supra note 12, at 224-25; Sunstein, supra note 14, at 1434 ("For most of 
the nation's history, there was no distinctive body of standing doctrine."). 
30. See Fletcher, supra note 12, at 224; Sunstein, supra note 14, at 1434 (stating that 
"standing depended on whether positive law created a cause of action"). See generally 
JOSEPH VINING, LEGAL IDENTITY: THE CoMING OF AGE OF PUBLIC LAW 20-33 (1978). 
31. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). Commentators argue that because Marbury v. 
Madison "emphasized the necessity for judicial protection of vested or legal rights," Mar­
bury provided a basis for the private rights model of judicial power. Nichol, supra note 12, 
at 1919-20. Marbury also provides an interpretive basis for the public law model ofjudicial 
authority, the antithesis. to the private model. See infra notes 53-56 and accompanying text 
for a discussion of the public model. 
32. See Bandes, supra note 2, at 277; Nichol, supra note 12, at 1920 (courts were 
restricted to arbitrating disputes involving private rights between private parties); Coyle, 
supra note 12, at 1068; Sunstein, supra note 14, at 1434-35. 
33. See Bandes, supra note 2, at 277. 
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these injuries.34 Courts would not imply a private right of action for 
these litigants. 
During the 1930's, standing doctrine evolved into a distinct body 
of legal principles. This evolution was a reaction to the rapid growth 
of administrative agencies and an increase in litigation over adminis­
trative agencies' obligations.3s Courts used early standing doctrine to 
determine which parties could sue to compel a governmental agency 
to fulfill its legal obligations.36 The doctrine was based on a legal in­
terest testY Under this test, if a statute clearly granted standing to 
the plaintiff in a particular context, a court could grant standing to 
sue. 38 If, on the other hand, the statute was silent on the issue of 
standing, courts would grant standing only if the violated right was 
actionable in common law property, tort, or contract.39 Thus, the 
legal interest test was a mixture of statutory and common law 
notions.40 
In the 1960's, the federal courts began to expand the legal interest 
34. See Sunstein, supra note 14, at 1434-35. 
35. Fletcher, supra note 12, at 225. See generally Sunstein, supra note 14, at 1434­
39. Courts and commentators have likened agencies to a "fourth branch" of government. 
FfC v. Ruberoid Co., 343 U.S. 470, 487 (1952) (Jackson, J., dissenting). 
36. Fletcher, supra note 12, at 225. 
37. See Tennessee Elec. Power Co. v. Tennessee Valley Auth., 306 U.S. 118, 137-38 
(1939), overruled by Association of Data Processing Serv. Orgs., Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 
150 (1970); Coyle, supra note 12, at 1068 (stating that the legal interest test provided a 
"framework" for the determination of standing). 
38. Likewise, if the statute clearly denied standing, then the court would not grant 
standing. See. e.g., Act of March 20, 1933, Pub. L. No. 73-2, § 5, 48 Stat. 8, 9 (veterans' 
benefits). This Act precluded judicial review of an agency's refusal of a veteran's benefits 
regardless of whether the veteran had an independent basis for standing. Id. See also 
Fletcher, supra note 12, at 227. 
39. Tennessee Power, 306 U.S. at 137-38 (stating that parties lacked standing to sue 
under the Tennessee Valley Authority Act "unless the right invaded is a legal right,-<me 
of property, one arising out of contract, one protected against tortious invasion, or one 
founded on a statute which confers privilege"); Fletcher, supra note 12, at 227. 
40. Fletcher, supra note 12, at 226; see Tennessee Power, 306 U.S. at 137-38. 
The legal interest test was predicated upon the private rights model of Marbury v. 
Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). See Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. Mc­
Grath, 341 U.S. 123, 151-53 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring); Nichol, supra note 12, at 
1919-20. Professor Sunstein argues that New Dea1-era courts adopted the private rights 
model in order to insulate the newly created New Deal agencies from judicial attack. See 
Sunstein, supra note 14, at 1437-38. 
The Administrative Procedure Act of 1946 ("A.P.A.") restated the federal courts' 
methods of determining standing under the legal interest test, declaring: "Any person suf­
fering legal wrong because of any agency action, or adversely affected or aggrieved by such 
[agency] action within the meaning of any relevant statute" had standing to sue to enforce 
that agency's actions. Pub. L. No. 79-404, § IOI(a), 60 Stat. 237, 243 (1946) (codified as 
amended at 5 U.S.C. § 702 (1988». See also, Fletcher, supra note 12, at 227; but see 
Antonin Scalia. The Doctrine 0/Standing as an Essential Element 0/the Separation 0/Pow­
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test. Some courts implied rights of action in suits against the govern­
ment and granted standing where litigants could show that they were 
regulatory beneficiaries.41 To determine if a litigant was a regulatory 
beneficiary, courts analyzed the statute to determine the scope of its 
protection and then determined whether the litigant's interests fell 
within the statute's scope of protection. A court could imply a right of 
action if the litigant's interests were protected by the statute.42 In ad­
dition, the Supreme Court liberalized the legal interest test to include 
voter43 and taxpayer44 challenges to agency actions.45 
The Supreme Court's decision in Association of Data Processing 
Service Organizations, Inc. v. Camp 46 further "liberalized access to the 
federal courts"47 by rejecting the legal interest test48 and replacing it 
with a two step analysis. First, the plaintiff had to show an injury in 
fact.49 Second, the plaintiff's interest had to be "arguably within the 
zone of interests to be protected or regulated by the statute or consti­
ers, 17 SUFFOLK u. L. REV. 881, 887 (1983) (arguing that the A.P.A. did not merely 
restate existing federal court practice, but instead "broadened the traditional rules"). 
41. See Office of Communication of United Church of Christ v. FCC, 359 F.2d 994, 
l()()()-06 (D:C. Cir. 1966) (standing granted to members of television audience to argue 
against a broadcast license renewal based on a statutory analysis of the Federal Communi­
cations Act); Scenic Hudson Preservation Conference v. Federal Power Comm'n, 354 F.2d 
608, 615-17 (2d Cir. 1965) (standing granted to users of the environment based upon a 
statutory analysis of the Federal Power Act). 
42. See cases cited supra note 41. 
43. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962) (allowing voters to challenge a legislative 
apportionment plan). 
44. Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968) (allowing a taxpayer to challenge government 
allocation of tax revenues authorized by Congress under the Article I, § 8, Taxing and 
Spending Clause of the Constitution). 
45. Fletcher, supra note 12, at 227-28 (describing the growing attempts to sue gov­
ernment agencies by individuals with no injury different from the general populace); 
Nichol, supra note 12, at 1920 (noting the "[l]iberalized judicial review of administrative 
decisionmaking"); Coyle, supra note 12, at 1070 (noting that as litigation against govern­
ment agencies increased, courts correspondingly broadened standing requirements "well 
beyond the narrow interests of the actual litigants"). 
46. 397 U.S. 150 (1970). 
47. Nichol, supra note 12, at 1921; see also Data Processing, 397 U.s. at 154 (Writing 
for the majority, Justice Douglas noted that, at least where statutes were concerned, courts 
had been granting standing to challenge administrative actions to larger classes of people.). 
48. The Court stated: "The 'legal interest' test goes to the merits. The question of 
standing is different." Data Processing, 397 U.S. at 153. In other words, the legal interest 
test was no longer considered part of the threshold standing inquiry reached before a deci­
sion on the merits. See also Nichol, supra note 12, at 1921 (noting that the Court in Data 
Processing replaced the legal interest test with an injury in fact requirement). 
49. Data Processing, 397 U.S. at 152. Instead of having to show that a private right 
was violated, plaintiffs were able to claim more abstract injuries in fact. See. e.g., cases 
cited infra note 51. 
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tutional guarantee in question."so Following Data Processing, the 
Court granted standing to claimants in a variety of cases that would 
previously have been dismissed for lack of standing.s1 Often the inju­
ries found in these cases were difficult to distinguish from injuries to 
the general public. S2 
Commentators have argued that Data Processing-era cases sig­
naled a trend towards the use of a public law model of judicial power 
as the interpretive basis of standing; federal courts were said to be 
more concerned with enforcing government fidelity to the law than 
with restricting themselves to private disputes only.s3 The public law 
model, based upon a broad interpretation of Marbury v. Madison,s4 
views as the federal courts' primary role the power to construe and 
enforce the Constitution and federal law.ss Thus, litigants have a 
SO. Data Processing, 397 U.S. at 153. The purpose of the "zone of interests" analysis 
is to determine whether "in view of Congress' evident intent to make agency action pre­
sumptively reviewable, a particular plaintiff should be heard to complain of a particular 
agency decision." Clarke v. Securities Indus. Ass'n, 479 U.S. 388, 399 (1987). Only if "the 
plaintiff's interests are so marginally related to or inconsistent with the purposes implicit in 
the statute that it cannot reasonably be assumed that Congress intended to permit the suit" 
will a court deny standing. Id. This standard of judicial review "is not meant to be espe­
cially demanding." Id. 
"Zone of interests" is a concept used to describe the individual interests that a statute 
or constitutional guarantee is intended to protect. See id. at 399-400; Data Processing, 397 
U.S. at 153-54. 
51. See. e.g., Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205 (1972) (finding 
that injury to interracial association interest grounded in 1968 Civil Rights Act was suffi­
cient to grant standing); Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672 (1971) (allowing citizen-tax­
payers to sue the government to challenge government grants to religious universities). See 
also Nichol, supra note 12, at 1921 (noting that in the period following Data Processing, the 
Supreme Court recognized claims that "federal courts would have rejected in earlier eras"); 
Wald, supra note 6, at 720 (stating that the period after Data Processing was a "new era of 
broadened standing"). 
52. See cases cited supra note 51. See also Fletcher, supra note 12, at 227 (noting 
that many of the attempts to sue government agencies in the 1960's and 1970's involved 
litigants asserting injuries not markedly different from those that most of the population 
could claim); Nichol, supra note 12, at 1922 (noting that many plaintiffs claimed injuries 
"widely shared among the populace"); Wald, supra note 6, at 719-20 (noting that before 
the mid-1970's, a broad variety of injuries were found to satisfy standing requirements). 
Injuries common to the general populace violate the private model principle of al­
lowing federal courts jurisdiction only where the litigant sues upon a right specific to the 
litigant (e.g., tort, contract, and constitutional rights). See supra notes 31-34. Thus, under 
a private model analysis, courts would not grant standing to litigants that assert injuries 
common to all. 
53. See Fletcher, supra note 12, at 227; Sunstein, supra note 14, at 1446, 1450-51 
n.85. 
54. 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137 (1803). 
55. See id. at 176-77 (stating that federal courts have the power to assess the consti­
tutionality of congressional acts); TRIBE, supra note 2, § 3-2; Sunstein, supra note 14, at 
1450 -5 1. 
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broader claim to standing under a public model analysis. They can 
assert that the government has acted unlawfully by not enforcing the 
law, as opposed to being restricted to standing, under a private model, 
only where the government has breached a duty owed to the litigant. 56 
The Burger Court reacted to this trend of liberalized access to the 
courts "by substantially tightening the Data Processing test."57 Com­
mentators have argued that this restrictive trend is based on a return 
to the private rights model of judicial power. 58 This trend has contin­
ued and is the basis for modern standing requirements. S9 
B. Modern Standing Requirements 
Modern standing doctrine has been divided into two sets of con­
siderations: Article III constitutional considerations and judicially 
56. In support of the public law model, Professor Bandes argues, "First, the federal 
courts are best suited to the task of constitutional adjudication. Second, they were origi­
nally conceived for that purpose. Third, and alternatively, constitutional interpretation 
and enforcement have become their primary role since the Civil War. And fourth, this role 
is the most efficient use of judicial resources." Bandes, supra note 2, at 281-82 (footnotes 
omitted). 
57. Nichol, supra note 12, at 1923; see also Wald, supra note 6, at 720. For two 
examples of the more stringent Burger Court standard, see Valley Forge Christian College 
v. Americans United for Separation of Church & State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464 (1982), and 
Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737 (1984). The Court in Valley Forge found that the plaintiffs 
lacked a sufficiently particularized injury in fact and denied standing to plaintiffs challeng­
ing Congress' allocation of land to a religious college. Valley Forge, 454 U.S. at 485, 489­
90. 
The plaintiffs in Allen were parents of black school children who alleged that the In­
ternal Revenue Service lacked adequate standards and procedures to ensure that racially 
discriminatory private schools were denied tax-exempt status. The result, plaintiffs argued, 
was that the Internal Revenue Service awarded tax-exempt status to some racially discrimi­
natory private schools. The plaintiffs further argued that because of the discriminatory 
private schools' tax-exempt status, the schools were able to stay open and enroll white 
students who would otherwise attend public schools. 
The Supreme Court recognized the parents' injury in fact as "their children's dimin­
ished ability to receive an education in a racially integrated [public] school." Allen, 468 
U.S. at 756. However, the Court denied plaintiffs standing to sue because the parents failed 
to satisfy the causal nexus requirement; revocation of the racially discriminatory private 
schools' tax-exempt status was held not to be sufficiently certain to facilitate public school 
racial integration. Id. at 758-59. 
58. See BandeS, supra note 2, at 229 (arguing that recent federal court decisions 
indicate an "unstated acceptance of the private rights model"). 
59. "It is clear ... that the Court has selectively employed standing doctrine ... to 
constrict the expansive access to federal courts previously enjoyed by litigants challenging 
governmental action." TRIBE, supra note 2, at 110; see also Nichol, supra note 12, at 1923­
24; Wald, supra note 6, at 720 (stating that the trend to tighten standing requirements, 
which began in the mid-1970's, has continued and has become such a "paramount focus of 
[the federal courts] ... that [n]o plaintiff ... can afford ... to be unprepared to defend 
standing"). 
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imposed prudential .considerations.60 These considerations are in­
tended to effectuate the limitation Article III places upon federal 
courts to hear only cases and controversies.61 Failure to satisfy both 
constitutional and prudential considerations will result in denial of 
standing.62 
The Article III constitutional considerations consist of three 
"core component[s]."63 A plaintiff must (1) show a "distinct and pal­
pable"64 injury in fact65 that is (2) "fairly traceable to the defendant's 
allegedly unlawful conduct and [(3)] likely to be redressed by the re­
quested relief. "66 The injury in fact must not be " 'abstract' or 'conjec­
tural' or 'hypothetical.' "67 Abstract interests lacking a palpable 
injury fail standing requirements.68 Injury requirements have been ar­
gued as necessary to ensure that a claimant has a "personal stake" in 
the litigation,69 to weed out overly abstract cases,70 and to encourage 
60. Allen, 468 U.S. at 750-51; see also Valley Forge, 454 U.S. at 471; TRIBE, supra 
note 2, § 3-14, at 107. 
61. Allen, 468 U.S. at 750 (Article III requirements "state fundamental limits on 
federal judicial power in our system of government."). 
62. See Gladstone Realtors v. Village of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91, 99-100 (1979) (stat­
ing that if both Article III and prudential considerations are not met, courts will deny 
standiilg). For a discussion of Gladstone, see Vernon Gorton, Note, Standing to Sue in 
Federal Court: The Direct Injury Standard-Gladstone Realtors v. Village of Bellwood, 
441 U.S. 91 (1979), 2 W. NEW ENG. L. REv. 793 (1980). 
Additionally, when determining whether a plaintiff has met standing requirements, a 
court must read the plaintiff's complaint in a favorable light. Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 
490, 501 (1975). 
63. Allen, 468 U.S. at 751. 
64. Id. (quoting Gladstone, 441 U.S. at 100 (quoting Warth, 422 U.S. at 501». 
65. Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208, 218 (1974) (stat­
ing that the "essence [of a case or controversy] requirement is a[n] 'injury in fact' ") (quot­
ing Association of Data Processing Serv. Orgs., Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 152 (1970»; 
see also Allen, 468 U.S. at 751. Commentators have argued, however, that courts place less 
weight upon the injury requirement or, in some instances, drop the injury requirement 
altogether in favor of a zone of interests analysis. See Fletcher, supra note 12, at 264; 
Coyle, supra note 12, at 1078; infra notes 170-73 and accompanying text. 
66. Allen, 468 U.S. at 751. 
67. Id.; see also Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 101-02 (1983); O'Shea v. Lit­
tleton, 414 U.S. 488, 494 (1974). Courts often restate the avoidance of abstract injury 
requirement by insisting on a "concrete" injury. See Schlesinger, 418 U.S. at 220-21; In re 
United States Catholic Conference, 885 F.2d 1020, 1023-24 (2d Cir. 1989), cert. denied sub 
nom. Abortion Rights Mobilization, Inc. v. United States Catholic Conference, 110 S. Ct. 
1946 (1990). 
68. Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church & 
State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 485-86 (1982). 
69. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962); Nichol, supra note 12, at 1927 (noting 
the value of actual injury requir~ments). 
70. Nichol, supra note 12, at 1927. 
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self- determination,11 The second and third prongs of traceability and 
redressability are "essentially ... a causal nexus between the plaintiff's 
injury and the defendant's assertedly unlawful act."72 
Courts impose further limiting principles upon themselves to ef­
fectuate Article III case and controversy limits. 73 These additional 
limiting principles, commonly referred to as prudential considerations, 
require a court to deny standing, even when,Article III considerations 
are met,74 if (1) a litigant raises another person's legal rights;75 (2) a 
litigant attempts to litigate subject matter that unnecessarily forces a 
court to intrude on another branch's dominion; 76 or (3) a litigant's 
claim is not protected by a statute or constitutional guarantee's "zone 
of interests."77 
The Article III and prudential considerations that make up mod­
ern standing doctrine are predicated on the separation of powers prin­
ciple.78 The Supreme Court views standing doctrine as a tool to 
effectuate the limited role federal courts should play in a democratic 
71. Id. Injury in fact requirements encourage the most directly injured persons to 
litigate their own rights. 
72. In re United States Catholic Conference, 885 F.2d 1020, 1024 (2d Cir. 1989), 
cert. denied sub nom. Abortion Rights Mobilization, Inc. v. United States Catholic Confer­
ence, 110 S. Ct. 1946 (1990). 
73. Gladstone Realtors v. Village of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91,99-100 (1979) (pruden­
tial considerations are used "to avoid deciding questions of broad social import where no 
individual rights would be vindicated and to limit access to the federal courts to those 
litigants best suited to assert a particular claim."). 
74. Id. 
75. Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751 (1984). 
76. Id.; see also Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208, 222 
(1974) (denying standing in part because the relief sought would have "produc[ed] a con­
frontation with one of the coordinate branches of the Government"); Flast v. Cohen, 392 
U.S. 83, 106 (1968) (stating that courts lack "confidence in [hearing] cases ... where a 
taxpayer seeks to employ a federal court as a forum in which to air his generalized griev­
ances about the conduct of government or the allocation of power in the Federal System"). 
This second. limitation is also known as the avoidance of generalized grievances limitation. 
See infra note 77 for the Supreme Court's discussion of prudential considerations in AI/en. 
77. Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church & 
State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 474-75 (1982); see also Flast, 392 U.S. at 106. 
The Supreme Court in AI/en articulated the prudential considerations as: 
limits on the exercise of federal jurisdiction, such as the general prohibition on a 
litigant's raising another person's legal rights, the rule barring adjudication of 
generalized grievances more appropriately addressed in the representative 
branches, and the requirement that a plaintiff's complaint fall within the zone of 
interests protected by the law invoked. 
AI/en, 468 U.S. at 751. 
78. AI/en, 468 U.S. at 752 ("Article III standing is built on a single basic idea-the 
idea of separation of powers. "). But see Gene R. Nichol, Jr., Abusing Standing: A Com­
ment on Allen v. Wright, 133 U. PA. L. REV. 635 (1985) (arguing against standing based 
upon separation of powers). 
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society as authorized by Article 111.79 This narrow view of judicial 
authority seeks to avoid "overjudicialization of the processes of self­
governance" by avoiding unnecessary conflicts with other government 
branches.8o It is also intended to foster democratic accountability 
(persons denied standing will be forced to challenge government ac­
tions by other means, such as lobbying, grass roots political cam­
paigns, etc.) and free up the federal courts for claims properly before 
the courtS.81 The separation of powers principle appears to be 
grounded in an interpretation of Marbury v. Madison approximating 
the private rights model because it effectively screens out broad claims 
asserting the government's failure to enforce a law.82 
II. COMPETITIVE ADVOCATE STANDING AND ITS ApPLICATION 

IN CASE LAW 

A. Competitive Advocate Standing 
The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit recently articulated 
a new theory of standing that it called "competitive advocate stand­
ing."83 Under this theory, a court may grant standing to political ad­
vocates who are unable to effectively compete with a fellow competitor 
advocate because the government has conferred unfair advantages on 
the competitor advocate by enforcing the law in a discriminatory man­
79. Allen, 468 U.S. at 752. Standing helps to weed out cases that, if admitted, would 
turn federal courts into a " 'forum in which to air . . . generalized grievances about the 
conduct of government.''' Valley Forge, 454 U.S. at 483 (quoting Flast, 392 U.S. at 106). 
80. Scalia, supra note 40, at 881-82 (arguing that the framers incorporated the sepa­
ration of powers principle into Article III, and that this principle is best effectuated by 
strictly requiring concrete and particularized injury); see also TRIBE, supra note 2, § 3-14, 
at 108-09 (asserting that separation of powers principles were implicit in Burger Court 
decisions before being expressly recognized in Allen). 
81. Nichol, supra note 12, at 1916-17; see also C. Douglas Floyd, The Justiciability 
Decisions o/the Burger Court, 60 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 862, 869 (1985); Scalia, supra note 
40, at 894-97. 
82. See TRIBE, supra note 2, § 3-14, at 110 (describing the Supreme Court's trend 
towards more restrictive standing requirements and arguing that implicit in this trend is an 
adoption of the private rights model of Marbury v. Madison); Bandes, supra note 2, at 277 
("The view of the separation of powers ... assumes that the role of the judiciary is solely to 
decide the rights of individuals."). In addition, the Supreme Court's interpretation of in­
jury in fact as requiring concrete injury and its prudential requirement of avoidance of 
generalized grievances indicates use of the private model because these concepts help weed 
out claims common to the general population. See supra note 67 for a discussion of con­
crete injury; see supra note 76 for a discussion of generalized grievances. 
83. See In re United States Catholic Conference, 885 F.2d 1020, 1023-24 (2d Cir. 
1989), cert. denied sub nom. Abortion Rights Mobilization, Inc. v. United States Catholic 
Conference, 110 S. Ct. 1946 (1990); see also Schwartz, supra note 12. 
198 WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 14:185 
ner.84 In other words, a sufficient injury in fact exists where the gov­
ernment's discriminatory enforcement of the law unfairly tilts the 
playing field in favor of one political advocate over a fellow competitor 
political advocate.85 
Competitive advocate standing differs from the traditional stand­
ing model requiring a "direct withholding of a benefit due the plain­
tiff"86 because it recognizes the benefit unfairly conferred upon 
competitor advocates as sufficient injury. This form of injury is thus 
slightly broader than the traditional standing model; it recognizes the 
less direct injury of increased competitive advantage conferred upon 
political competitors. 
Competitive advocate standing is derived from two principal 
sources: voter standing theory and the economic competitor standing 
theory.87 In voter standing cases, courts have granted standing to liti­
gants where the government's actions restrict the litigants from effec­
tively participating in the political process as voters. 88 This theory 
recognizes as sufficient injury a reduction in the litigants' voting 
power.89 
Competitive a9vocate standing and voter standing share a com­
mon basis in political inequity: both theories recognize injuries that 
occur when the government's failure to enforce the law evenhandedly 
84. Catholic Conference, 885 F.2d at 1028-29; see also Schwartz, supra note 12, at 
723. 
85. Catholic Conference, 885 F.2d at 1029. In addition to satisfying this fonn of 
injury in fact, complainants must still satisfy the remaining constitutional and prudential 
considerations. Id. at 1029 n.2, 1031. 
86. Schwartz, supra note 12, at 726. 
87. See Catholic Conference, 885 F.2d at 1028-29. 
88. See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 208 (1962); see also JoAnne L. Dunec, Note, 
Voter Standing: A New Means for Third Parties to Challenge the Tax-Exempt Status of 
Nonprofit Organizations?, 16 HASTINGS CoNST. L.Q. 453, 465 (1989). 
89. See Baker, 369 U.S. at 207-08 (recognizing sufficient injury where enforcement 
of a statute placed voters "in a position of constitutionally unjustifiable ineqUality vis-a-vis 
voters in irrationally favored counties"); Catholic Conference, 885 F.2d at 1028. 
The district court originally granted standing to the plaintiffs in Catholic Conference 
using the voter standing theory. See Abortion Rights Mobilization, Inc. v. Regan, 544 F. 
Supp. 471, 482 (S.D.N.Y. 1982), rev'd sub nom. In re United States Catholic Conference, 
885 F.2d 1020 (2d Cir. 1989), cerro denied sub nom. Abortion Rights Mobilization, Inc. v. 
United States Catholic Conference, 110 S. Ct. 1946 (1990). The district court argued that 
non-enforcement of Internal Revenue Code § 501(c)(3) against the Catholic Church dis­
torted the political process and thus justified granting voters, participants in the political 
process, standing. Id. The Second Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the district court's 
decision stating that the "plaintiffs' asserted basis for standing has nothing to do with vot­
ing." Catholic Conference, 885 F.2d at 1028. See generally Dunec, supra note 88, for a 
discussion of voter standing in earlier Catholic Conference decisions. See infra note 101 for 
a discussion of Internal Revenue Code § 501(c)(3) requirements. 
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distorts the political process. Voter standing, however, requires that 
the political inequity affect a litigant's voting power.90 Competitive 
advocate standing, on the other hand, requires that the political in­
equity affect a litigant's ability to compete with fellow political 
competitors. 
The Second Circuit further developed competitive advocate 
standing by relying on the Supreme Court's economic competitor 
91cases. In these cases, the Supreme Court granted standing to parties 
who could show that the government's failure to enforce relevant laws 
conferred unfair economic advantages upon the parties' competitors.92 
For example, the plaintiffs in Association of Data Processing Service 
Organizations, Inc. v. Camp 93 challenged a federal comptroller's rul­
ing allowing banks, such as the defendant's bank, to foray into the 
data processing field and make data processing services available to 
clients and other banks.94 The plaintiffs, data processors, claimed that 
the Comptroller's ruling violated sections of the National Bank Act, 
including a provision prohibiting banks from "engag[ing] in any activ­
ity other than the performance of bank services for banks. "95 The 
Court, calling the case a "competitor's suit,"96 found that injury in fact 
existed where "competition by national banks in the business of pro­
viding data processing services might entail some future loss of profits 
for the petitioners."97 The Second Circuit reasoned that the Supreme 
Court's recognition of injury to competitors in the economic realm 
justified recognizing injuries to competitors in the political realm. 98 
90. See Baker, 369 U.S. at 207-08. 
91. Catholic Conference, 885 F.2d at 1029. The Catholic Conference court relied 
upon Texas Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock, 489 U.S. 1 (1989); Clarke v. Securities Indus. Ass'n, 
479 U.S. 388 (1987); Investment Co. Inst. v. Camp, 401 U.S. 617 (1971); Arnold Tours, 
Inc. v. Camp, 400 U.S. 45 (1970) (per curiam); and Association of Data Processing Serv. 
Orgs., Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150 (1970). See also Schwartz, supra note 12, at 730-31 
(arguing that the Second Circuit's competitive advocate standing theory is "analytically 
identical" to District of Columbia cases recognizing harm to political competitiveness as 
sufficient injury in fact). 
92. See cases cited supra note 91. 
93. 397 U.S. 150 (1970). 
94. Data Processing, 397 U.S. at 151. 
95. Bank Service Corporation Act of 1962, § 4, 76 Stat. 1132 (codified as amended at 
12 U.S.C. § 1864 (1988». 
96. Data Processing, 397 U.S. at 152. 
97. Id. 
98. In re United States Catholic Conference, 885 F.2d 1020, 1030 (2d Cir. 1989), cert 
denied sub nom. Abortion Rights Mobilization, Inc. v. United States Catholic Conference, 
110 S. Ct. 1946 (1990) (stating that "political competitors arguably should fare as well" as 
economic competitors). 
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B. Competitive Advocate Standing Case Law 
1. Fulani v. League of Women Voters Education Fund 99 
In League of Women Voters, the Second Circuit recognized an 
Article III injury in fact that was very similar to that recognized by 
the competitive adYocate standing theory.loo The defendant, the 
League of Women Voters Education Fund ("the League"), was a tax­
exempt, non-profit association organized under Internal Revenue 
Code ("I.R.c.") § 501(c)(3).lol The League aimed to educate voters 
and encourage participation in the electoral processl02 by sponsoring 
three nationally televised primary debates, two for the contenders for 
the 1988 Democratic presidential nomination and one for the contend­
ers for the 1988 Republican presidential nomination. lo3 The plaintiff, 
Dr. Lenora Fulani, an independent and minor party presidential can­
didate, attempted to participate in the League sponsored debates. The 
League denied her participation because she was not seeking to be 
either the Democratic or Republican presidential nominee. 104 Fulani 
appealed an unsuccessful attempt to enjoin the League from con­
99. 882 F.2d 621 (2d Cir. 1989). 
100. Referring to League 0/ Women Voters, the Court of Appeals for the District of 
Columbia stated, "The Second Circuit accepted Fulani's theory of competitor standing 
...." Fulani v. Brady, 935 F.2d 1324, 1328 (D.C. Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 912 
(1992). 
101. I.R.C. § 50l(c)(3) (1988). I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) confers tax-exempt status to: 
Corporations, and any community chest, fund, or foundation, organized and op­
erated exclusively for religious, charitable, scientific, testing for public safety, lit­
erary, or educational purposes, ... no substantial part of the activities of which is 
carrying on propaganda, or otherwise attempting, to infiuence legislation (except 
as otherwise provided in subsection (h», and which does not participate in, or 
intervene in (including the publishing or distributing of statements), any political 
campaign on behalf of (or in opposition to) any candidate for public office. 
Id. 
In addition to tax exemption, tax-exempt organizations may receive tax deductible 
contributions pursuant to I.R.C. § 170(c) (1988). The Code, however, requires a trade off 
for these benefits. Tax-exempt organizations cannot devote a substantial portion of their 
activities towards infiuencing legislation or campaigning ("electioneering"). Regan v. Tax­
ation With Representation of Wash., 461 U.S. 540, 544 (1983) (holding the trade off of no 
electioneering for tax exemption constitutional). See also, 26 C.F.R. 1.501(c)(3)-I(b)(3) 
(1991); In re United States Catholic Conference, 885 F.2d 1020, 1022 (2d Cir. 1989), cert. 
denied sub nom. Abortion Rights Mobilization, Inc. v. United States Catholic Conference, 
110 S. Ct. 1946 (1990) (tax-exempt organizations must restrain their "right to try and 
influence the political process" or face revocation of their tax-exempt status). But see Rev. 
Rul. 78-248, 1978-1 C.B. 154 ("Certain 'voter education' activities conducted in a non­
partisan manner may not constitute prohibited political activity under section 501(c)(3)."). 
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ducting the debates without her participation. lOS 
Fulani claimed that the League's failure to invite her to the de­
bates constituted "partisan" activities because the League "structured 
the debate phase of its primary election voter education program in 
such a way as to favor the two traditional major parties, and to ex­
clude significant independent and minor party candidates such as her­
self."I06 Because these allegedly "partisan" activities violated the 
League's tax-exempt charter under I.R.C. § 501(c)(3), Fulani re­
quested that the court revoke the League's tax-exempt statuS.107 
A Second Circuit panel noted that the "powerful beneficial effect 
... [of the] mass media ... [can confer] some competitive advan­
tage"108 to participants in televised debates. The court found a suffi­
cient injury in fact in the "loss of competitive advantage flowing from 
the League's exclusion of Fulani from the national debates."I09 Suffi­
cient injury existed where the government's allegedly preferential en­
forcement of the laws significantly benefitted one political competitor 
over another.110 
2. In re United States Catholic Conference III 
One month after deciding League of Women Voters, the Court of 
Appeals for the Second Circuit decided Catholic Conference .112 In 
Catholic Conference the Second Circuit expressly articulated competi­
tive advocate standing theory, a theory that also recognized competi­
tive political injury as a sufficient Article III injury in fact. The 
plaintiffs in Catholic Conference consisted of three organizations with 
105. Fulani v. League of Women Voters Educ. Fund, 684 F. Supp. 1185 (S.D.N.Y. 
1988), aff'd, 882 F.2d 621 (2d Cir. 1989). 
106. League of Women Voters, 882 F.2d at 624. 
107. [d. 
108. [d. at 626. 
109. [d. 
110. [d. After finding that Fulani satisfied the second and third prongs of the Article 
III constitutional considerations, the court granted Fulani standing to sue. The court then 
held against Fulani on the merits, stating that the "League's exclusion of [Fulani] from its 
primary season debates did not constitute 'partisan' activity in contravention of I.R.C. 
§ 501(c)(3)." [d. at 630. 
Judge Cardamone's concurring opinion agreed with the final holding, but disagreed 
with the majority's method in reaching the holding. [d. (Cardamone, J., concurring). He 
found that Fulani failed to meet the second and third prongs of the constitutionality test 
and, therefore, lacked standing to sue. [d. at 630-33. No consideration of the merits 
would then have been necessary. 
111. 885 F.2d 1020 (2d Cir. 1989), cert. denied sub nom. Abortion Rights 
Mobilization, Inc. v. United States Catholic Conference, 110 S. Ct. 1946 (1990). 
112. [d. 
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tax-exempt charters under I.R.C. § 501(c)(3),113 one organization with 
a tax-exempt charter under I.R.C. § 501(c)(4),lI4 and twenty individu­
als (mainly Protestant ministers and Jewish rabbis).lIs All of the 
plaintiffs believed in a woman's right to a legal abortion. 116 
The plaintiffs claimed that the Catholic Church ("the Church") 
violated statutes governing the Church's tax-exempt statUS.117 They 
claimed that the Church devoted a substantial portion of its activities 
towards influencing the political process by "electioneering," 
campaigning for and indirectly financing pro-life candidates. liS The 
plaintiffs contended that the Internal Revenue Service ("I.R.S.") knew 
of the violations yet chose to look the other way.119 They claimed that 
the I.R.S. sheltered the Church from the tax law by not taking appro­
priate actions to ensure that the Church complied with tax exemption 
rules. 120 Because other tax-exempt organizations, like those in Catho­
113. The three I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) organizations were Abortion Rights Mobilization, 
Inc., the National Women's Health Network, Inc., and the Women's Center for Reproduc­
tive Health. Id. at 1021; Abortion Rights Mobilization, Inc. v. Regan, 544 F. Supp. 471, 
474 (S.D.N.Y. 1982) (listing the Women's Center for Reproductive Health as an I.R.C. 
§ 501(c)(3) organization). 
114. The one I.R.C. § 501(c)(4) organization was the Long Island National Organi­
zation for Women. Catholic Conference, 885 F.2d at 1021. 
115. Id. 
116. Id. 
117. Id. at 1022. The Church is an I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) organization. Id. at 1021-22. 
For a discussion of I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) requirements, see supra note 101. 
118. Catholic Conference, 885 F.2d at 1022. 
119. Id. The plaintiffs originally filed the suit against the I.R.S. and the Church. 
The district court granted the Church's motion to dismiss itself as a defendant in 1982. 
Abortion Rights Mobilization, Inc. v. Regan, 544 F. Supp. 471 (S.D.N.Y. 1982) ("ARM 
I"), rev'd sub nom. In re United States Catholic Conference, 885 F.2d 1020 (2d Cir. 1989), 
cert. denied sub nom. Abortion Rights Mobilization, Inc. v. United States Catholic Confer­
ence, 110 S. Ct. 19460.990). In 1982 and 1985, the district court ruled that the plaintiffs 
had standing to sue the Secretary of the Treasury and the Commissioner of Internal Reve­
nue. ARM 1,544 F. Supp. at 491-50a; Abortion Rights Mobilization, Inc. v. Regan, 603 F. 
Supp. 970 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) ("ARM II"), rev'd sub nom. In re United States Catholic Con­
ference, 885 F.2d 1020 (2d Cir. 1989), cert. denied sub nom. Abortion Rights Mobilization, 
Inc. v. United States Catholic Conference, 110 S. Ct. 1946 (1990). The standing issues in 
Catholic Conference arose after the Church, as a non-party witness, refused to comply with 
the plaintiffs' discovery requests. The Church claimed that the plaintiffs did not satisfy 
standing requirements and, therefore, should not be able to litigate. The appellate court 
said that the Church lacked standing to challenge the plaintiffs' standing and held the 
Church in contempt. In re United States Catholic Conference, 824 F.2d 156 (2d Cir. 
1987), rev'd sub nom. United States Catholic Conference v. Abortion Rights Mobilization, 
Inc., 487 U.S. 72 (1988). The Supreme Court reversed and held that because the Church 
was a non-party witness held in contempt, it had standing to challenge the plaintiffs' stand­
ing. United States Catholic Conference v. Abortion Rights Mobilization, Inc., 487 U.S. 72 
(1988). Therefore, to settle the discovery requests at issue, the appellate court first had to 
settle the issue of whether the plaintiffs had standing to sue the government. 
120. Catholic Conference, 885 F.2d at 1022. 
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lic Conference, still had to abide by the same tax exemption statutes, 
the plaintiffs claimed that the I.R.S. treated the Church preferen­
tially.12l They wanted the I.R.S. to revoke the Church's tax-exempt 
status, "collect the resulting back taxes, and . .. notify contributors to 
the Catholic Church that they may no longer claim their donations as 
deductions on their income tax retums."122 
In its majority opinion, a Second Circuit panel found that the 
plaintiffs lacked sufficient injury in fact 123 and thus did not satisfy 
competitive advocate standing requirements. 124 The court grounded 
its finding on two premises: (1) the plaintiffs were not "competitors" 
with the Church within the meaning of competitive advocate standing 
theory; 125 and (2) the plaintiffs' claimed injury was not sufficiently par­
ticularized. 126 The court found that the plaintiffs and the Church 
were not competitors in the same political arena because the plaintiffs 
chose "not to match the Church's alleged electioneering with their 
own."127 The Catholic Conference majority required exact, "per­
sonal" competition between competitor political advocates because 
such personal competition was viewed as implicit in the relied upon 
economic competitor cases. 128 
The court found that the plaintiffs did not suffer a sufficiently par­
ticularized injury in fact because the plaintiffs did not "plead[] that 
they were personally denied equal treatment."129 The fact that the 
Church was electioneering had no bearing on the plaintiffs unless they 
too tried to electioneer and were personally denied equal opportunity 
to do SO.130 The plaintiffs would have to show injury on the political 
campaign field to satisfy the injury in fact requirement. 13l The court 
held that even if they were to recognize an alternative view of the 
121. Id. 
122. Id. at 1023. 
123. Id. at 1030. The court also found that the plaintiffs failed to satisfy clergy, 
taxpayer, and voter standing requirements. Id. at 1024-28. 
124. Id. at 1031. The court never reached the second and third prongs of Article III 
constitutionality considerations or prudential considerations because it found that the 
plaintiffs did not meet the first Article III requirement of injury in fact. Id. at 1029 n.2, 
1031. 
125. Id. at 1029 ("The fatal flaw in [the plaintiffs'] argument is that [they] are not 
players in [the same] arena or ... field" as the Church.). 
126. Id. at 1030. The particularized injury in fact requirement requires a "distinct 
and palpable" injury. See supra notes 64-65 and accompanying text. 
127. Id. at 1029. 
128. [d. See supra notes 91-98 and accompanying text for a discussion of the 
Supreme Court's economic competitor cases. 
129. Catholic Conference, 885 F.2d at 1030. 
130. [d. 
131. [d. 
204 WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 14:185 
plaintiffs' injury as injury to their pro-choice beliefs,'32 the injury re­
quirement would be insufficiently particularized. 133 Such an injury to 
the plaintiffs' beliefs "would lack a limiting principle [as it] would ef­
fectively give standing to any spectator who supported a given side in 
public political debate." 134 A lack of limiting principles would contra­
vene the Article III separation of powers precepts. 13S 
Finally, the Second Circuit noted that in the "stormy sea of this 
litigation, it is prudent to closely hug the shores of the pleaded facts 
and established law, and not venture out any further than we 
must."136 This indicated a policy of strict conformity with the recent 
legal trend restricting standing to sue to those litigants with narrow, 
private-like claims. 137 A wide range of litigants could assert the plain­
tiffs' injury in fact, as characterized by the majority.138 Thus, Catholic 
Conference's facts extended too far "off shore" to fall within the pur­
view of the modern trend. 
The dissenting judge, Judge Newman, disagreed with the major­
ity's finding that the plaintiffs and the Church were not "competitors" 
within the meaning of competitor advocate theory, 139 and with the 
majority's finding that the plaintiffs lacked a sufficiently particularized 
injury in fact. l40 Judge Newman found the narrow scope with which 
the majority viewed "competitors" unrea1istic. 141 A broader scope, he 
stated, would better reflect the multifaceted forms of political competi­
tion in a democracy. 142 He argued that competitor political advocates 
may choose to oppose each other by expounding their political views 
in activities beyond political campaigning. '43 He noted that political 
competition could take the form of "speak[ing with] friends and neigh­
bors; ... participat[ing] in community activities; [and] devot[ing] ... 
132. Id. 
133. Id. 
134. Id. This broad notion of injury could contravene the prudential considerations 
of avoiding general grievances as well. See supra note 76 and accompanying text for a 
discussion of the prudential policy of avoiding the litigation of generalized grievances. 
135. See supra notes 78-82 and accompanying text for a discussion of modem stand­
ing doctrine as being predicated on the separation of powers principle. 
136. Catholic Conference, 885 F.2d at 1031. 
137. See supra notes 57-59, 78-82 for a discussion ofthe modem legal trend that uses 
the private model of judicial power as its interpretive basis. 
138. See supra notes 133-35 and accompanying text. 
139. Catholic Conference, 885 F.2d at 1031-32 (Newman, J., dissenting). 
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. d' "144 J dtlme, ... energy, an sometlmes ... money to ... causes. u ge 
Newman felt that political competition was not limited to adversaries 
in a political campaign.'4s 
For support, Judge Newman relied on Texas Monthly, Inc. v. Bul­
lock. l46 In Texas Monthly, the Supreme Court found that the plain­
tiff, Texas Monthly, a magazine publisher catering to the general 
public, had standing to challenge the tax status of a third party, a 
magazine publisher catering to a specific religious audience. 147 Be­
cause Texas Monthly was granted standing to challenge the tax status 
of a publisher with which it was not in direct competition, Judge New­
man interpreted this case to create a broader focus of competition than 
that used by the majority in Catholic Conference. 148 Thus, Judge. 
Newman found that the plaintiffs and the Church need not have en­
gaged in the direct political competition of electioneering to satisfy 
injury requirements. 149 Instead, he claimed that sufficient injury ex­
isted because the plaintiffs chose "to compete ... by speaking, writing, 
and marching, and by championing in countless other ways the cause 
of abortion rights."'so 
Judge Newman also disagreed with the majority's finding that the 
plaintiffs lacked a sufficiently particularized injury in fact. He first ar­
gued that the majority misdefined the injury .IS I Instead of finding no 
injury because the plaintiffs and the Church did not compete with each 
other, or defining the injury as one to plaintiffs' beliefs, Judge Newman 
argued that the injury in fact was the plaintiffs' "competitive disadvan­
tage" flowing from the government's allegedly unequal enforcement of 
the tax exemption laws. ls2 He viewed the plaintiffs as competitively 
disadvantaged because, being confined to the "insubstantial lobbying 
activities" permitted by the tax laws, they could not effectively com­
pete on the same level with the Church's stronger political 
144. Id. 
145. Id. 
146. Id. (citing Texas Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock, 489 U.S. 1 (1989». 
147. Texas Monthly, 489 U.S. at 8. 
148. Catholic Conference, 885 F.2d at 1032 (Newman, J., dissenting). Judge New­
man refers to Texas Monthly as an economic competitor case. See id. The Supreme Court 
in Texas Monthly, however, never expressly recognized the case as an economic competitor 
case nor did it cite to economic competitor precedent. See Texas Monthly, 489 U.S. at 7-9. 
149. Catholic Conference, 885 F.2d at 1032. 
150. Id. Judge Newman also argued that the court should not have denied the plain­
tiffs standing when they obeyed tax exemption laws and the Church allegedly did not obey 
these same laws. Id. at 1033. See also Schwartz, supra note 12, at 735-36. 
151. Catholic Conference, 885 F.2d at 1032 (Newman, J., dissenting). 
152. Id. at 1032-33. 
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electioneering. 153 
Judge Newman next argued that the injury in fact was sufficiently 
particularized because the injury was limited to tax- exempt organiza­
tions complying with I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (the plaintiffs) and those alleg­
edly violating the same tax exemption provision (the Church).154 
Judge Newman argued that any injury to parties beyond the purview 
of 1.R.e. § 501(c)(3) was "a question far beyond the narrow issue ... 
in this case."155 The limiting principle of I.R.C. § 501(c)(3), he ar­
gued, placed standing in this case "entirely within manageable 
bounds." 156 
III. AN ANALYSIS OF COMPETITIVE ADVOCATE STANDING 

UNDER THE PUBLIC AND PRIVATE MODELS OF 

FEDERAL COURT AUTHORITY 

Commentators have argued that the public rights model/private 
rights model dichotomy is a fundamental concept that drives all stand­
ing analyses. 157 The analytical model that courts adopt will influence 
their constitutional and prudential analyses and, ultimately, the deci­
sion as to whether or not a litigant has standing to sue. 15S The modem 
trend towards restricting standing, which began in the 1970's, has 
been attributed to a movement back to the use of the private rights 
model as the interpretive basis of standing. 159 Commentators have 
criticized the courts' failure to clearly enunciate this movement. l60 
The criticism has focused on the ease with which courts can manipu­
late the standing analysis in the absence of clearly articulated analyti­
cal guideposts.161 
153. Id. 
154. Id. at 1033. 
155. Id. 
156. Id. The majority had concluded that the plaintiffs' injury was not cognizable 
because it lacked a "limiting principle." Id. at 1030; see also supra notes 132-35 and ac­
companying text. 
157. See generally Bandes, supra note 2 (arguing for a public law interpretive basis 
for all justiciability doctrines associated with Article III, including standing); see also Sun­
stein, supra note 14, at 1480 (arguing that the current standing trend incorporates private 
model traits). 
158. See generally Sunstein, supra note 14, at 1464-66. 
159. See Sunstein, supra note 14, at 1433 ("Recent ... innovations in the law of 
standing have started to push legal doctrine in the direction of ... a private-law model of 
standing. "). 
160. See TRIBE, supra note 2, § 3-14, at III ("The aspect of the Court's standing 
jurisprudence most open to criticism ... [is] the Court's lack of candor in articulating and 
justifying the basic choice [between public or private law models] it has made."). 
161. Id. at 110-11. 
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This Section argues that competitive advocate standing has a dual 
nature, incorporating traits of both the public and private models of 
judicial power. As stated by the Catholic Conference court, competi­
tive advocate standing appears to be primarily public in nature. How­
ever, the Catholic Conference court's method of applying competitive 
advocate standing also evokes strong private model traits. In an effort 
to demonstrate competitive advocate standing's dual nature, this Sec­
tion analyzes competitive advocate standing as a public model theory 
and as a private model theory. 
A. Competitive Advocate Standing as a Public Law Theory 
Competitive advocate standing doctrine as stated in Catholic Con­
ference requires a litigant to show that the government's failure to en­
force a statute unfairly confers an advantage on the litigant's political 
competitor. 162 This formulation of the injury in fact requirement ap­
pears quite broad. Litigants may claim an indirect injury in fact 
merely by showing that their political competitors are favored. 163 
Thus, the government need not directly hamper the litigant's competi­
tive ability; it only has to favor the litigant's political competitors. l64 
Competitive advocate standing's injury in fact requirement ap­
pears public in nature because a greater number of plaintiffs could 
claim standing to sue the government than would otherwise be permit­
ted under the private model of federal court jurisdiction. Standing 
would not be restricted to only those claimants in direct, personal 
competition with their competitors (Le., those claimants demonstrat­
ing injuries specific to themselves). Instead, standing could be granted 
to all claimants showing (1) that they directly or indirectly competed 
with an opposing party in the political arena and (2) that the govern­
162. In re United States Catholic Conference, 885 F.2d 1020, 1029 (2d Cir. 1989), 
cert. denied sub nom. Abortion Rights Mobilization, Inc. v. United States Catholic Confer­
ence, 110 S. Ct. 1946 (1990). A litigant who satisfies these requirements will have met the 
Article III injury ,in fact requirement and must further satisfy the causal nexus requirement 
together with any prudential considerations. See supra notes 60 -82 and accompanying text 
for a discussion of modem standing requirements. 
163. Catholic Conference, 885 F.2d at 1029. "'In the inherently competitive polit­
ical arena an advantage granted to one competitor automatically constitutes a hardship to 
others.''' Id. (quoting the Complaint ~ 41). See Schwartz, supra note 12, at 726 (noting 
that competitive advocate standing injury "results from the granting of an advantage to a 
competitor and not from the direct withholding of a benefit due the plaintiff"). 
164. In its application of competitive advocate standing theory, however, the major­
ity narrowed the scope of competitive advocate standing by insisting on head-to-head, per­
sonal competition amongst competitors. See Catholic Conference, 885 F.2d at 1029-30. 
See infra notes 205- 07 and accompanying text for a private model interpretation of the 
majority's requirement of head-to-head competition. 
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ment's failure to enforce the law impaired the claimant's ability to 
compete with the opposing political competitor. 16S 
This greater access to federal courts promotes the public model 
view of federal court jurisdiction by increasing the likelihood that fed­
eral courts will have to ensure that the government complies with the 
law.l66 Federal courts will have more opportunities to hear claims 
against the government and decide whether or not the government is 
complying with its own laws. 
For example, federal courts would be compelled to rule upon 
charges that the government has failed to enforce the law in a non­
discriminatory manner in cases where claimants satisfied injury in fact 
requirements solely on the basis of indirect injury. In these cases, the 
claimant's personal injury, or private right of action, would not exist; 
the government would not have breached a common law, statutory, or 
constitutional duty that it owed to the claimant. Federal courts would 
thus primarily be concerned with ensuring the government's fidelity to 
the law. This result would reflect the public law model's view of the 
federal courts' primary duty as interpreting the Constitution, not 
merely deciding private disputes. 167 
The economic competition cases that the Catholic Conference 
court relies upon further support the public law interpretation of com­
petitive advocate standing. 168 In the economic competitor cases, the 
Supreme Court granted litigants standing to sue the government to 
enforce statutory regulations where the government conferred unfair 
advantages upon an economic comp~titor.169 The Supreme Court ap­
165. This broader formulation of competitive advocate standing raises potential 
floodgate problems: more litigants would be able to sue in federal courts, and the courts 
could thus be unable to cope with the potential flood of competitive advocate cases. But see 
Bandes, supra note 2, at 296-97. Responding to floodgate arguments, Professor Bandes 
maintains that (1) the public law model has a limiting principle-cases calling for an inter­
pretation of the Constitution are preferred; (2) federal courts are currently not too 
overburdened to handle public law cases; and (3) even if federal courts are facing an on­
slaught of litigation, public law ought to occupy highest priority. ld. 
166. Professor Sunstein argues that broadly characterized injuries serve public model 
purposes because a greater range of injuries are recognized and the causation requirement 
is more easily satisfied. See Sunstein, supra note 14, at 1464-66. Courts can, therefore, 
hear a greater range of suits against the government and can more ably fulfill their public 
law function of enforcing the government's fidelity to the law. 
167. See Bandes, supra note 2, at 281 (explaining that public theory views the federal 
courts' primary role as interpreting and enforcing federal law and the Constitution); see 
supra notes 53-56 and accompanying text for a discussion of public model derivations and 
purposes. 
168. See supra note 91 and accompanying text for the economic cases on which the 
court relied. 
169. See cases cited supra note 91. 
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peared to devalue the injury in fact requirement in favor of a zone of 
interests analysis. 
In fact, the Supreme Court in Clarke v. Securities Industry 
Ass'n,170 a recent economic competitor case, did not even discuss in­
jury in fact. 171 Instead, the Supreme Court granted standing to the 
plaintiff based on an extensive zone of interests analysis. 172 Commen­
tators have argued that Clarke may have rejected the injury in fact 
requirement in statutory injury cases in favor of a zone of interests 
analysis. 173 
The zone of interests analysis requires courts to ascertain whether 
the legislature intended a claimant to have standing to sue in a particu­
lar context. 174 This emphasis on the zone of interests analysis, similar 
to the statutory analysis method that grew from the legal interest 
test,175 appears to focus the courts' judicial powers primarily on ensur­
ing governmental compliance with the law, and secondarily on con­
stricting itself to ruling upon traditional private rights. Thus, the 
public model appears to be the analytical basis for the economic com­
petitor cases relied upon by Catholic Conference. 
Applying the public law interpretation of competitive advocate 
standing to the facts of Catholic Conference, it is likely that the out­
come would have been different; the court would have granted stand­
ing to the plaintiffs. Injury in fact, the first constitutional prong, 
would have been satisfied because, using the broad scope of political 
competition advocated by dissenting Judge Newman,176 the Church 
170. 479 U.S. 388 (1987). In Clarke, a trade association representing firms in the 
securities industry contested a Comptroller of the Currency ruling that allowed two banks 
to provide discount brokerage services to the public. Id. at 390-93. The trade association 
maintained that the ruling violated § 36(c) of the McFadden Act. Id. at 392-93 (citing 
McFadden Act of 1927, ch. 191, § 7,44 Stat. 1224, 1228 (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. 
§ 36 (1988»). 
171. See Clarke, 479 U.S. at 393 n.5. 
172. Id. at 400-03. 
173. Id. at 401-03; Fletcher, supra note 12, at 263-64 ("[T]he Court's rejection of 
Data Processing's two-step inquiry into the existence of standing must be regarded as a 
significant clarification, and improvement, of standing law."); Coyle, supra note 12, at 
1077-78. Discussing the Court's failure to analyze injury in Clarke, Mr. Coyle argues that 
Clarke establishes a new standing inquiry limited to a "zone of interests" analysis. Id. He 
further argues that Clarke indicates that the "zone of interests" test would apply to all 
A.P.A. claims and most other claims as well. Id. 
174. Clarke, 479 U.S. at 399; see Fletcher, supra note 12, at 264-65 ("[T]he touch­
stone [in a standing inquiry] is statutory intent: Does the statute confer on plaintiff the 
right to enforce the asserted duty?"). 
175. See supra notes 41- 45 and accompanying text. 
176. See supra notes 139- 45 and accompanying text for a discussion of the scope of 
Judge Newman's view of political competition. 
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and the plaintiffs could have been found to be political competitors. 
They supported and voiced opposing opinions on the abortion issue. 
Moreover, the causal nexus requirement of traceability and 
redressability l77 may have been satisfied by arguing that were the 
Church threatened with revocation of its tax-exempt status, it would 
have likely stopped electioneering and conformed to the non-partisan 
requirements ofl.R.C. § 501(c)(3) so as to ensure its survival. 178 Reli­
gious organizations like the Catholic Church depend for their liveli­
hood on tax-exempt status and tax deductible donations; 179 revocation 
177. Judges and commentators lllike have noted that the causal nexus requirement is 
extremely malleable. They argue that the causal nexus requirement is susceptible to conjec­
ture on the merits, how the injury in fact is framed, and the analytical model the court 
chooses to use. See Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 782 (1984) (Brennan, J., dissenting) 
(Causation is "no more than a poor disguise for the Court's view of the merits of the 
underlying claims."); TRIBE, supra note 2, § 3-18; Sunstein, supra note 14, at 1464-65. 
178. But see Allen, 468 U.S. at 756-59. The Supreme Court in Allen ruled that the 
impact of tax exemption revocation on the racially discriminatory practices of some private 
schools was "entirely speculative." Id. at 758. Because the revocation would not have, in 
the Court's view, necessarily cured the discriminatory conduct of the private schools, the 
causal nexus requirement of Article III was not satisfied. The Court therefore denied plain­
tiffs standing to sue. Id. at 758-59. See also Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 
426 U.S. 26,40-46 (1976) (holding that, when the defendants' response to tax exemption 
revocation was unclear, the causal nexus was broken and standing to sue was therefore 
denied). See supra note 57 for a more detailed discussion of Allen. 
It could be argued that revocation of the Church's tax- exempt status would have pro­
duced the same specUlative result: the Church, free of any electioneering restrictions, may 
then have pursued its political objectives openly and more vigorously. See D.B. ROBERT­
SON, SHOULD CHURCHES BE TAXED? 227 (1968). If the Church's response to revocation 
of its tax- exempt status would have been uncertain, the causal nexus requirement would 
have been broken and an alternate ground for denial of standing established. See Allen, 468 
U.S. at 758-59; Simon, 426 U.S. at 40-46. 
179. Commentators have argued that the revocation of tax-exempt status for reli­
gious organizations would sound the death knell for economically unstable religious organi­
zations. See ROBERTSON, supra note 178, at 228; THE RELIGIOUS SITUATION 1968942 
(Donald R. Cutler ed. 1968). These commentators have further argued that revocation of 
tax-exempt status would force even economically stable religious organizations to restrict 
or cut off their community activities altogether to focus on fiscal survivorship. See ROB­
ERTSON, supra note 178, at 228; THE RELIGIOUS SITUATION 1968, supra, at 942. A 1978 
survey of Rochester, N.Y.-area churches confirms this severe impact. See Vaughn Pol­
menteer, Some Don't Have to Pay, ROCHESTER DEMOCRAT & CHRON., Apr. 9, 1978 (Mag­
azine), at 5. For example, one Rochester-area Roman Catholic church, the Blessed 
Sacrament Church, figured' that, based on the 1978 tax rate, its tax-exempt status repre­
sented $81,900, approximately half of its annual budget. Id. The Church's pastor pre­
dicted that the Church would have to close its school and cut back community programs 
without tax exemption. Id. 
The government also has an interest in exempting religious organizations like the 
Church from taxation. The Supreme Court has stated that tax exemption of religious orga­
nizations is necessary to ensure the separation of church and state. The Court has argued 
that the taxation process would create excessive entanglement between church and state by 
involving the government in valuations and assessments of church property. See Walz v. 
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of their I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) status would likely curtail donations and 
severely hamper their ability to function as religious organizations. 18o 
Were the Church to conform to the I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) requirements, 
the plaintiffs' injury of reduced political effectiveness vis-a-vis the 
Church would be redressed-both the Church and the plaintiffs would 
be competing with the same non-partisan activity restrictions. 
League of Women Voters can also be argued to have adopted the 
public law model as an analytical basis. The League of Women Voters 
court used a broad focus in determining that Fulani had a sufficient 
injury in fact. 181 For example, it found that the loss of Fulani's com­
petitive advantage from exclusion in the League's debate was sufficient 
injury in fact. 182 This injury was based on the diminished political 
stature and recognition that allegedly resulted from exclusion from the 
debates. 183 However, the court could not offer evidence as to the spe­
cific value that media coverage would have had to Fulani. It could 
only make a general statement that Fulani could have lost "some com­
petitive advantage" from her inability to participate in the debates. 184 
It is difficult to see how such general injury meets the "distinct 
and palpable" requirement of Article III injury in fact. All eighty-two 
1988 presidential candidates could have feasibly claimed Fulani's loss 
of "some competitive advantage." Yet the Second Circuit, using a 
broad focus, was willing to look past such vagaries and traditional 
standing concepts to find sufficient injury in fact.18S 
Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 675-76 (1970). But see John Witte, Jr., Tax Exemption 0/ 
Church Property: Historical Anomaly or Valid Constitutional Practice?, 64 S. CAL. L. REV. 
363, 366-67 (1991) (arguing that the Court's excessive entanglement argument is "con­
trived" because the government is already closely involved in church activities through the 
zoning, landmarking, and incorporation processes). 
180. See discussion supra note 179. See generally Glenn Goodwin, Note, Would 
Caesar Tax God? The Constitutionality o/Governmental Taxation o/Churches, 35 DRAKE 
L. REV. 383 (1986). Arguing that the exemption of churches from taxes is constitutionally 
mandated, Mr. Goodwin states: "To grant the state the power to impose such a tax on a 
church would be equivalent to granting the state the power to control or suppress the 
religious activities ofthe church. 'The power to tax involves the power to destroy.''' Id. at 
400 (quoting McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 429 (1819». 
181. See supra notes 108-10 and accompanying text. 
182. League 0/ Women Voters, 882 F.2d at 626. 
183. Id. 
184. See supra notes 108-10 and accompanying text. 
185. Perhaps the court's holding was motivated by its observation that denial of 
standing in this case "would [have] impl[ied] that such a candidate could never challenge 
the conduct of the offending agency or party." League 0/ Women Voters, 882 F.2d at 626. 
In other words, the Second Circuit may have loosened injury in fact requirements in the 
interest of allowing a party to sue to enforce an agency's obligations and to avoid effectively 
screening a federal agency's actions from judicial review. The Supreme Court, however, 
expressly rejected use of this policy to grant standing. Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to 
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Fulani's claim to standing under a public law analysis may be 
buttressed with a zone of interests analysis of I.R.C. § 501(c)(3). The 
main problem with this statutory analysis is that, because no hearings 
were held when the electioneering prohibition was enact~d, no clear 
legislative intent with regard to the purpose of I.R.e. § 501(c)(3) is 
ascertainable. 186 However, one commentator has argued that Con­
gress intended to protect partisan activists not able to claim the full 
benefits of I.R.e. § 501(c)(3) against I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) organizations 
who are able to enjoy the I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) benefits of deductible con­
tributions and tax exemption. 187 Thus, a "purpose of the [I.R.C. 
§ 501(c)(3)] restriction is to discourage the [I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) benefi­
ciaries] from creating an unfair imbalance in the political arena."188 
Under this interpretation of I.R.C. § 501(c)(3), Fulani would be 
within the ambit of the statute's protection because she was engaging 
in partisan activities by running for political office. Using the public 
model of judicial authority, Fulani would have standing to sue the 
government to enforce the government's fidelity to the law. 189 
Additional support for a public rights model interpretation of 
League of Women Voters is found in Fulani v. Brady.190 In Brady, a 
case involving exactly the same facts, plaintiff, and legal issues as 
League of Women Voters, the United States District Court for the Dis­
trict of Columbia expressly rejected the findings of League of Women 
Voters .191 
The District Court for the District of Columbia denied Fulani 
standing based on its finding that her injury was "speculative" and 
Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208, 227 (1974) ("The assumption that if respondents have no 
standing to sue, no one would have standing, is not a reason to find standing."). 
186. See Coyle, supra note 12, at 1100-01. 
187. Id. See also BRUCE R. HOPKINS, THE LAW OF TAX-EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS 
14-16 (5th ed. Supp. 1991) and ROBERT L. HOLBERT, TAX LAW AND POLITICAL ACCESS: 
THE BIAS OF PLURALISM REVISITED 27 (1975) for a recounting of the legislative history 
behind I.R.C. § 501(c)(3). 
188. Coyle, supra note 12, at 1101. 
189. Alternately, this interpretation of I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) may hamper the plaintiffs 
as they were not engaged in partisan political activity-I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) barred them 
from doing so. 
190. 729 F. Supp. 158 (D.D.C. 1990), aff'd on other grounds, 935 F.2d 1324 (D.C. 
Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 912 (1992). For a discussion of the appellate court 
decision, see infra note 197. 
191. Brady, 729 F. Supp. at 162. One difference between League of Women Voters 
and Brady is that the defendant in League of Women Voters was the League of Women 
Voters. On the other hand, the defendant in Brady was the United States Government, 
specifically, Secretary of the Treasury Nicholas F. Brady and Internal Revenue Service 
Commissioner Lawrence B. Gibbs. 
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"attenuated at best."192 The district court reasoned that it was too 
hard to determine "with any degree of reasonableness" what gain me­
dia coverage actually bestowed upon Fulani's competitors and, con­
versely, what degree of harm was conferred upon Fulani. 193 There 
were too many variables194 on which to base a "meaningful" evalua­
tion of her harm. 195 
The Brady district court refused to adopt the broader view of in­
jury in fact espoused by the League of Women Voters court196 and 
found that Fulani's injury did not satisfy narrowly drawn injury re­
quirements. Thus, the district court's criticism of League of Women 
Voters' broad scope indicates that the Second Circuit in League of 
Women Voters was more lenient in its analysis of injury in fact. 197 The 
Second Circuit's willingness to bypass stringent standing requirements 
in favor of deciding the case on the merits fulfilled its public law duty 
of ensuring government fidelity to the law. 
When viewed as a public law theory, competitive advocate stand­
ing would probably have produced similar results in both League of 
Women Voters and Catholic Conference-both plaintiffs would have 
198had standing to sue. There may, however, be an alternate explana­
tion for the denial of standing in Catholic Conference, even under a 
192. Id. 
193. Id. at 163. 
194. For example, the court noted that media exposure is of questionable value as 
evinced by then Vice President Bush's request for "less rather than more opportunities to 
engage in debate appearances." Id. at 163 n.8. The court saw the amount of increase in 
public recognition from debate appearances and the factors composing political stature as 
variables that were not reasonably quantifiable. Id. at 162-63. 
It can be argued, however, that media exposure is greatly beneficial to a relatively 
unknown candidate, like Fulani, because the media exposes the candidate to an audience 
that may never have heard of the candidate. Unlike then Vice-President Bush, who had an 
abundance of media exposure and may have sought to limit it, Fulani, and other minor 
party candidates in her position, was faced with a paucity of media exposure. Fulani 
would, therefore, have sought as much media exposure as possible. 
195. Id. at 162. 
196. Referring to the League of Women Voters decision, the District Court for the 
District of Columbia stated: "[M]erely stating the obvious [value of debates] does not sub­
stitute for analysis of the injury requirement in Article III standing." Id. 
197. In affirming the district court opinion, the appellate court stressed the lack of 
causation and redressability. Fulani v. Brady, 935 F.2d 1324, 1328-31. The appellate court 
majority never once took a clear stance on whether injury in fact existed; it merely stated 
what Fulani alleged her injury to be. See. e.g., id. at 1326 ("According to Fulani, [the 
sponsor of the presidential debates] directly injured her by depriving her of the media cov­
erage ...."); but see id. at 1332 (Mikva, C.J., dissenting) (arguing that "the majority does 
not dispute the constitutional sufficiency of Fulani's alleged injury"). The appellate court, 
however, did not expressly disagree with the district court's injury in fact analysis. 
198. A public law analysis is thus reconcilable with the holding in League of Women 
Voters and irreconcilable with the holding in Catholic Conference. 
214 WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 14:185 
public law analysis. Courts have traditionally been hesitant to grant a 
litigant standing to litigate the tax liability of a fellow taxpayer.199 
This policy is based on two grounds: a fear of "widespread litigation, 
uncertainty, and unfortunate stare decisis effects";200 and a negative 
inference of congressional intent-Congress could not have intended 
to imply standing to assess another's tax liability when it specifically 
granted standing to some taxpayers and not others.201 This policy 
may have informed the court's decision not to grant the plaintiffs 
standing in Catholic Conference because they were asking the court to 
rule on the tax liability of a fellow taxpayer, the Church.202 Perhaps 
the court's stated policy of strict conformity with prior case law203 
implicitly recognized the judicial policy against allowing standing to 
assess a fellow taxpayer's tax liability.204 
199. See, e.g., Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26 (1976). In his 
concurrence in Simon, Justice Stewart stated: "I cannot now imagine a case, at least 
outside the First Amendment area, where a person whose own tax liability was not affected 
ever could have standing to litigate the federal tax liability of someone else." Id. at 46 
(Stewart, J., concurring). 
Justice Stewart's quote stating the policy against standing to litigate another taxpayer's 
tax liability has given rise to vigorous arguments over how to characterize injury in fact. 
For example, Chief Judge Mikva, the dissenting judge in the Brady appellate court deci­
sion, argued that Fulani's "core allegation" was based on a restriction of her First Amend­
ment rights: the government's discriminatory enforcement of the laws suppressed her 
ability to express her political ideas. Brady, 935 F.2d at 1333 (Mikva, C.J., dissenting). 
Reading Justice Stewart's opinion to state that individuals raising First Amendment- based 
claims could contest the tax liability of fellow taxpayers, Chief Judge Mikva argued that 
because Fulani had a First Amendment-based injury, Fulani had standing to litigate the tax 
liability of the debate sponsor. Id. 
The majority in the Brady appellate court decision, however, characterized Fulani's 
claim as rooted in the tax liability of a fellow taxpayer. Id. at 1326-27. Thus, the majority 
argued that Justice Stewart's opinion weighed against the granting of standing to Fulani. 
Id. at 1327. 
See also Dunec, supra note 88, at 479-81. Ms. Dunec argues that granting standing to 
litigate nonprofit organizations' tax liability "could have a chilling effect on the very exist­
ence of nonprofit, charitable organizations." Id. at 481. 
200. Sunstein, supra note 14, at 1454 n.105. 
201. Id. For examples of specific grants of standing for taxpayers, see 26 U.S.C. 
§§ 7422, 7426, 7428-7429 (1988). 
202. As relief, the plaintiffs requested the revocation of the Church's tax-exempt sta­
tus. In re United States Catholic Conference, 885 F.2d 1020, 1023 (2d Cir. 1989), cert. 
denied sub nom. Abortion Rights Mobilization, Inc. v. United States Catholic Conference, 
110 S. Ct. 1946 (1990). Thus, the Church's tax liability would have increased from tax-free 
liability to fully taxable liability. 
203. See supra notes 136-37 and accompanying text. 
204. Of course, this same policy against litigation of a fellow taxpayer's tax liability 
would apply to League of Women Voters because Fulani was litigating the League's tax 
liability. 
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B. Competitive Advocate Standing as a Private Rights Model 
Theory 
Though competitive advocate standing is in some measure public 
in nature, the Second Circuit's application of competitive advocate 
standing in Catholic Conference also demonstrates its strong private 
law traits. These traits were especially evident in the court's interpre­
tation of the competition requirement; the court interpreted competi­
tion to require head to head personal competition.205 The plaintiffs 
could have satisfied such exacting injury requirements only by match­
ing the Church's electioneering with their own, thereby breaking the 
law.206 
This view of competition effectively narrows disputes cognizable 
under competitive advocate standing to those disputes that have 
strong private-model-like characteristics.207 A personal competition 
requirement eliminates a broad range of potential litigants, especially 
those posing more abstract claims. Personal competition thus also 
serves as a limiting principle and helps avert any potential floodgate 
effects of a broad interpretation of competition. 
The Catholic Conference outcome would be justified under a pri­
vate law model interpretation of competitive advocate standing. As 
the Catholic Conference majority argued, the plaintiffs lacked suffi­
cient injury in fact because they were not in direct personal competi­
tion with the Church-the plaintiffs did not electioneer; the Church 
did. Without a sufficient injury in fact, the plaintiffs failed to satisfy 
Article III standing requirements.208 
The court's opinion in League of Women Voters is not as easily 
reconciled with the private model since the court used the language 
205. See supra notes 127-31 and accompanying text. 
206. Such a view might have the negative consequence of encouraging lawless self­
help in order to meet standing requirements. I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) litigants may violate the 
tax exemption rules by engaging in electioneering to meet the Catholic Conference's exact­
ing head to head injury requirement. See supra note 101 for a discussion of I.R.C. 
§ 501(c)(3) requirements. 
207. Professor Sunstein argues that narrowly defined injuries "move the [standing] 
doctrine sharply in the direction of the private-law model [of federal court jurisdiction] 
...." Sunstein, supra note 14, at 1457. A narrow characterization of an injury makes the 
causation requirements extremely difficult to prove and thereby eliminates all but the nar­
rowest private claims. Id. at 1463-66. See also id. for a discussion of the impact the char­
acterization of injury has on causation requirements and, ultimately, on standing 
determinations. 
208. In addition, it could have been argued that the causal nexus was not satisfied 
either. See supra notes 177- 80 and accompanying text for a discussion of causal nexus in 
Catholic Conference. 
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and approach of a public model.209 However, the facts of this case fit 
nicely within the private model: Fulani was a direct competitor who 
alleged that she suffered direct personal injury caused by the govern­
ment's breach of its duty to allow presidential candidates to compete 
on an equal basis. 
Additionally, Fulani arguably satisfied the head to head competi­
tion requirement. After all, Fulani was competing with the major 
party candidates for one job, the United States presidency. It is diffi­
cult to envision any more direct competition than that which exists 
when a group of people compete for one job.210 
League of Women Voters and Catholic Conference may be recon­
cilable under a private law analysis that uses as its normative model a 
more specific form of political competition-partisan electoral compe­
tition. Like competitive advocate standing, partisan electoral competi­
tion would grant political competitors standing to sue where the 
government unfairly conferred advantages upon a political competitor. 
Unlike competitive advocate standing, however, a partisan electoral 
competition would allow standing to sue only where the competitors 
were engaged in partisan electoral activity. 
The restrictive focus of partisan electoral competition would pro­
mote private model purposes by narrowing the field of potential claim­
ants to electoral aspirants and by weeding out mere issue advocates. 
Political activists directly oppose fellow competitors by running 
against each other as candidates for political office or by campaigning 
for political candidates. Thus, within the realm of political activity 
there is a high likelihood of direct personal competition. 
Recognizing standing in cases involving partisan electoral compe­
tition would also help protect an important value: ensuring an equal 
opportunity to participate in the electoral process. The importance of 
this value is evident in a line of Supreme Court cases beginning with 
Williams v. Rhodes.211 In these cases, the Court repeatedly protected 
209. The League of Women Voters court's adoption of the public model is all the 
more convincing when viewed in light of the district court's decision in Fulani v. Brady; 
See supra notes 181-97 and accompanying text for a discussion of League of Women Voters 
as a public model case. 
210. It can also be argued, however, that the personal competition requirement does 
not necessarily correlate with use of the private model. Where the group of people in 
personal competition with one another is large (such as the 82 aspirants for the 1988 presi­
dency), an individual's claim becomes more public in nature; anyone person in the large 
group would be able to assert the claim. 
211. 393 U.S. 23 (1968). See also Norman v. Reed, 112 S. Ct. 698 (1992); Anderson 
v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780 (1983); American Party of Texas v. White, 415 U.S. 767 (1974); 
Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724 (1974); Lubin v. Panish, 415 U.S. 709 (1974). For a discus­
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political parties' access to the ballot from unreasonably burdensome 
government restrictions. 212 Partisan electoral competition would fur­
ther this value by granting standing to political competitors so that 
they could challenge unfair enforcement of laws affecting their ability 
to compete in the political arena. 
The court in Catholic Conference would probably have arrived at 
the same conclusion under a partisan electoral competition analysis. 
The plaintiffs were merely non-partisan issue advocates, not partisan 
activists.213 Though the plaintiffs may indeed have suffered an injury 
because they were not able to voice their side of the abortion issue as 
loudly as one of their competitors, the Church, their injury would not 
be cognizable under a partisan electoral competition theory. The 
plaintiffs were not opposing the Church as partisan activists.214 Their 
sion of the Supreme Court cases dealing with restrictions on political parties' access to the 
ballot, see GERALD GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 849-54 (12th ed. 1991). 
212. See. e.g., Williams, 393 U.S. at 30-31. Justice Black, writing for the majority, 
invalidated Ohio election laws that placed "unequal burdens" on the right of individuals to 
exercise their "right ... to associate for the advancement of political beliefs." Id. at 30. 
Applying strict scrutiny to the laws, he found no compelling interest that justified the 
abridgement of such "precious freedoms." Id. at 30-31. 
213. As an I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) organization, the plaintiffs were barred from partisan 
activities. See supra note 101 for a discussion of I.R.C. § 501(cX3) requirements. 
214. A question exists as to whether one plaintiff, the Nassau, Long Island branch of 
the National Organization for Women ("Nassau NOW"), would have standing under com­
petitive advocate standing and partisan electoral standing. The majority in Catholic Con­
ference stated that "[P]artly as a result of [the] self-imposed restraint, plaintiffs chose not to 
compete [on the same political playing field as the defendants)." In re United States Catho­
lic Conference, 885 F.2d 1020, 1030 (2d Cir. 1989), cert. denied sub nom. Abortion Rights 
Mobilization, Inc. v. United States Catholic Conference, 110 S. Ct. 1946 (1990). 
It is not clear from where the self-imposed restraints were derived. If the court as­
sumed that Nassau NOW, an organization formed under I.R.C. § 501(c)(4), was not able 
to electioneer because of its tax exemption restrictions, the decision concerning Nassau 
NOW would not be convincing. 
Like I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) organizations, Nassau NOW is tax-exempt. As an I.R.C. 
§ 501(c)(4) organization, however, Nassau NOW (1) has the right to engage in election­
eering and (2) does not have the benefit of receiving tax deductible donations. Thus, Nas­
sau NOW was free to compete on the same political playing field as the Church. Nassau 
NOW would meet the head to head competition requirement that prevented the I.R.C. 
§ 501(c)(3) plaintiffs from satisfying competitive advocate standing (or partisan electoral 
standing). Moreover, Nassau NOW would satisfy the unfair competition requirements of 
competitive advocate standing and partisan electoral standing because the Church, an 
I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) organization, still retained the benefit of tax deductible donations while 
Nassau NOW was able to solicit fully taxable donations only. See id. at 1033-34 (Newman, 
J., dissenting). 
If, on the other hand, Nassau NOW imposed electioneering restrictions upon itself and 
refused to electioneer against the Church as a matter of principle, Nassau NOW would lack 
standing under both partisan electoral standing and competitive advocate standing, as in­
terpreted by the Catholic Conference majority. Nassau NOW would not have engaged in 
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remedy would lie in the political process where they could solicit the 
Executive Branch to enforce relevant laws. 
The outcome of League of Women Voters under a partisan electo­
ral competition analysis would also be justified. Fulani could have sat­
isfied the injury in fact requirement using partisan electoral 
competition theory because, by campaigning for office, Fulani was en­
gaging in partisan electoral activities just as were her competitors, the 
major party presidential candidates invited to the League's debates. 
The Article III causal nexus requirement could be satisfied using the 
League of Women Voters' analysis. Fulani would satisfy the traceabil­
ity requirement because, but for the League's tax-exempt status, there 
would have been no debate.2ls In addition, Fulani's injury would have 
been redressed because "practically speaking, revocation of the 
League's tax- exempt status at least would have prevented the 
League's sponsorship of the debates"216 and her injury would not have 
occurred. 
CoNCLUSION 
Analysis of League of Women Voters and Catholic Conference in­
dicates that these cases incorporate both private and public models of 
judicial authority. Failure to provide guidance as to what model of 
judicial authority underlies competitive advocate standing creates the 
potential for confusion217 and abuse,218 especially in light of the fact 
that the courts' choice of interpretive model may be outcome-determi­
native. The lack of clear interpretive guidance substantiates the criti­
cism often leveled by commentators that courts manipulate standing 
as an ad hoc tool for admitting or denying cases depending on the 
political bent of the particular court.219 
the required partisan activity, nor would it have been in head-to-head competition with the 
Church. See id. at 1030. 
215. Fulani v. League of Women Voters Educ. Fund, 882 F.2d 621, 628 (2d Cir. 
1989). But see id. at 630-33 (Cardamone, J., concurring) (arguing that Fulani failed to 
satisfy the causal nexus requirement). 
216. Id. at 628. 
217. See TRIBE, supra note 2, § 3-14, at 110. Professor Tribe maintains that the 
current trend towards restricting standing to limit federal court jurisdiction based on the 
private rights model of Marbury is legitimate. But, he argues, the methods used to restrict 
standing are confusing and provide little guidance as to what constitutes justiciable litiga­
tion. Id. 
218. Courts will be able to seize upon either model of judicial authority to justify 
their standing decisions. 
219. See. e.g., TRIBE, supra note 2, § 3-14, at 110-11 ("[C]ritics have charged the 
Court with habitually manipulating announced standing doctrine to pursue extraneous, 
often unacknowledged ends."); Nichol, supra note 12, at 1917 (describing how critics of the 
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Much of the potential for abuse and confusion may be eliminated 
if the Second Circuit would expose the interpretive basis of competi­
tive advocate standing to free and open debate and, based on the de­
bate, adopt a model of judicial authority. Adoption of a model of 
judicial authority would hold courts accountable to following that 
model on a consistent basis. Though there would be room for disa­
greement within the adopted model,220 courts would not be able to 
choose arbitrarily any model in an attempt to justify their competitive 
advocate standing holdings. 
Peter M. Seka 
current trend towards constricting standing requirements argue that courts are more inter­
ested in the "underlying claims rather than any objective measurement of injury"); David 
A. Domansky, Note, Abusing Standing: Furthering the Conservative Agenda, 29 WM. & 
MARY L. REv. 387, 414 (1988) (arguing that standing law as used by the Burger Court was 
"little more than a convenient vehicle to promote the conservative agenda"). 
220. Ambiguity within each conceptual realm may continue to exist. For example, 
the district and appellate courts in Fulani v. Brady implicitly adopted a private rights 
model and ruled that Fulani lacked standing. 729 F. Supp. 158 (D.D.C. 1990), aff'd on 
other grounds, 935 F.2d 1324 (D.C. Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 912 (1992). In 
Fulani v. League of Women Voters Educ. Fund, arguably a private model case, the court 
held oppositely: Fulani did have standing. Thus, even if one were to interpret both deci­
sions as incorporating the private model, the outcomes would be contradictory. See supra 
notes 209-10 and accompanying text for a discussion of League of Women Voters as a 
private model case. For further discussion of the relationship between the two Fulani 
cases, see supra notes 190 -97 and accompanying text. 
